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Low carbon energy technologies are not deployed in a social vacuum; there are a variety of complex ways in which people
understand and engage with these technologies and the changing energy system overall. However, the role of the public’s socio-
environmental sensitivities to low carbon energy technologies and their responses to energy deployments does not receive much
serious attention in planning decarbonisation pathways to 2050. Resistance to certain resources and technologies based on
particular socio-environmental sensitivities would alter the portfolio of options available which could shape how the energy system
achieves decarbonisation (the decarbonisation pathway) as well as affecting the cost and achievability of decarbonisation.Thus, this
paper presents a series of three modelled scenarios which illustrate the way that a variety of socio-environmental sensitivities could
impact the development of the energy system and the decarbonisation pathway. The scenarios represent risk aversion (DREAD)
which avoids deployment of potentially unsafe large-scale technology, local protectionism (NIMBY) that constrains systems to
their existing spatial footprint, and environmental awareness (ECO) where protection of natural resources is paramount. Very
different solutions for all three sets of constraints are identified; some seem slightly implausible (DREAD) and all show increased
cost (especially in ECO).
1. Introduction
Over the past decade, the UK government has become
increasingly aware that climate change and energy security
are urgent issues that will drive energy system change [1, 2].
Reducing the UK’s climate change impacts through decar-
bonisation while also achieving a secure, resilient energy sys-
tem depend on both strategies to reduce energy demand and
the deployment of low carbon energy technologies. However,
both the academic and policy communities have focused
their attention on developing and deploying technologies to
achieve decarbonisation. There has typically been less atten-
tion given to the consequences of successfully voiced public
objections to low carbon technologies and more generally
how this will influence the development of the whole energy
system. Yet, this is an important factor in shaping the possible
pathways to decarbonisation because public resistance to
certain technologies will alter the portfolio of options avail-
able. The UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC) modelled
future scenarios of the UK energy system in the Energy 2050
project [3]. It explored how public acceptance, as motivated
by particular socio-environmental sensitivities, could affect
the deployment of certain resources and technologies with
consequent impacts on the whole energy system.
Some scenarios in Energy 2050 looked at the potential
for accelerated development of low carbon energy supply
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technologies to alter the pathways to UK energy system
decarbonisation [4, 5]. However, those accelerated tech-
nology development (ATD) scenarios do not reflect the
potential for public responses to constrain the deployment
of energy supply technologies. These socio-environmental
constraints could shape the energy system as well as the
possible pathways to decarbonisation in UK.
Only recently has research started to be undertaken about
how public attitudes and responses could affect the energy
system at a system-wide level (e.g., [6]).There are studies that
look at individual technologies, for example, nuclear power
[7], carbon capture and storage [8], and biomass [9], but very
few that look across technologies as Carr-Cornish et al. [10]
did for Australia. Poortinga et al. [11] investigated lifestyle and
motivational factors that influence both demand and supply
of energy but did not fully explore the impact on the whole
energy system.
This paper addresses the gap in knowledge by examining
how people’s responses to particular energy technologies
(as determined by certain socio-environmental sensitivities)
could play a role in shaping the UK energy system. Socio-
environmental sensitivities in this paper are illustrated in
three different simplified scenarios which represent how a
given public concern/motivation could manifest itself in the
form of resistance to certain technologies and resources.
The scenarios, named NIMBY, ECO, and DREAD
(described in the next section), are illustrations of the types
of public responses that could be seen given particular
simplified motivations. The motivations behind each of the
three variant scenarios are qualitatively characterised based
on existing literature about public attitudes towards technolo-
gies and case studies of particular developments and siting
conflicts. They do not, however, reflect the complexities of
public opinions in the real world. In reality, these responses
would not be seen in isolation and unchanging over time, as
is the case in these scenarios.
Likewise, public opinion is not always a barrier; it can
also be an important enabling factor. However, the scenarios
provide a useful opportunity to examine how different types
of public responses could affect the possible pathways to
decarbonisation of the energy system. Without considering
the possible social acceptance limitations, UK could face
unexpected disruptions on the pathway to decarbonisation
because socio-environmental sensitivities could be important
determinants of whether, how, and at what cost UK achieves
decarbonisation. As such, socio-environmental sensitivities
require further research to better understand the potential
implications on the energy system. The debate in Britain
about the exploitation of shale gas and the impact of
demonstrations is an example of public sensitivity to novel
technology that will at least add delays and expense to
exploitation but may prevent its development.
2. Methodology
The UK energy system was modelled in UKERC Energy
2050 [3] using MARKAL (UK MARKAL model), a market
allocation economic model that uses linear programming
to reflect change over 5-year time steps. It is described as
“bottom-up” containing detailed information about different
energy platforms and sources and portrays the whole energy
system including the energy service demands of the whole
economy. The elastic demand version of the model (UK
MARKAL MED), where demands respond to supply price
changes under policy scenarios, has been used in UKERC
Energy 2050 studies. In this version of the model, higher
energy prices in general drive greater demand reductions.
However, the cost savings achieved from reducing demand
and consuming less fuel (gas, electricity, petrol, etc.) are
balanced against the cost of demand reduction as defined
in MARKAL-MED, as a result of foregoing the energy
services in question (they enjoy slightly less heating, electrical
services, or transport). The model optimises this balance
based on the value of the energy services, compared to the
cost of supplying them. In other words, it optimises for the
sum of producer plus consumer surplus. Details of the UK
version of the model and its uses can be found in papers by
Strachan and his colleagues [12, 13].
Using one of the core UKERC Energy 2050 scenarios,
the low carbon (LC) scenario, as a baseline scenario, three
variant scenarios were developed which modelled distinct
storylines about how people could respond to and constrain
the deployment of key low carbon energy supply technologies
and resources. The LC baseline scenario is based on firm
and funded policies as of the Energy White Paper 2007 and
achieves 80% decarbonisation by 2050 [14]. Accordingly, all
the variant scenarios described in this paper also achieve 80%
decarbonisation by 2050.The variant scenarios for the socio-
environmental work are named NIMBY, ECO, and DREAD.
The qualitative definitions and storyline of the scenarios
are based on the interpretation of the literature on public
attitudes and responses to energy technologies and case
studies of particular developments and siting conflicts. But
the scenarios are necessarily simplified. The scenarios largely
focus on the electricity sector technologies and resources,
with some exceptions where there are important crossovers
between sectors (such as bioenergy).
Using published literature as well as consultation with
experts, each scenario storyline was then translated into
quantitative impacts (constraints) on the deployment of
particular technologies. The impacts on the technologies
described in this work are not meant to be comprehensive
or “scientifically objective” statements; instead, they reflect a
hypothesised vision of how the general public under certain
conditions might respond to the technology.
Using these new technology and resource constraints,
each scenario was then modelled in the MARKAL-MED
energy system model. In this project, the MARKAL model
is used as a tool to explore the issue of socio-environmental
constraints and the modelling results are meant to illustrate
relevant issues for further exploration; it is not meant to be
a prediction of the future. MARKAL represents a techno-
economic view of the energy system which includes a high
level of detail on technology and resource costs and availabil-
ity. However, the model does not include any detail on the
social conditions in which the energy system is set, such as,
in this case, public attitudes and the constraints that could be
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imposed by public objections. By representing these socio-
environmental constraints in the model, this work sought to
use the MARKAL model in a novel way.
The resulting changes to the energy system are evaluated
in terms of the overall change in energy system make-up
(such as technology selection and demand reduction) and the
costs of the energy system and decarbonisation.The potential
impacts of accelerated development of low carbon energy
supply technologies on these socio-environmental scenarios
are then considered in a discursive manner.
3. Socio-Environmental Scenarios
3.1. NIMBY Scenario Definition. TheNIMBY scenario repre-
sents a storyline in which the public objects to certain energy
developments when they perceive the development to have
direct negative impacts on their lifestyle and community.The
primary direct impact considered in this scenario is visual
intrusion which many studies have cited as a key reason
for people’s opposition [15–17]. Accordingly, in the NIMBY
scenario, people exhibit a strong resistance to major changes
in their landscape. Devine-Wright [18] has described this
type of opposition “as a form of place-protective action,
which arises when new developments disrupt pre-existing
emotional attachments and threaten place-related identity
processes.” Gee [19] highlights that people’s perceptions of
their landscape play a role in shaping attitudes: the type of
perception of the landscape that would play a key role in this
scenario is that which recognises the recreational, spiritual,
and aesthetic benefits that people get from their environment.
Thus, in NIMBY, people’s attachment to their landscape is the
primary driver of opposition to the place-disruption that they
believe would occur with a given energy development [20].
Based on this definition of NIMBY as a form of place-
protective action with strong concern for the visual land-
scape, the NIMBY scenario has strong constraints imposed
on the deployment of technologies that are visually obtru-
sive. This included both technologies that have in the past
been objected to and new technologies where large visual
impacts are anticipated. Accordingly, where the technology
and infrastructure already exist, further developments will
generally be accepted. However, certain technologies will be
limited in places where that type of development is unfamiliar
and raises objections based on the visual landscape impact.
In the NIMBY scenario, the definition of people’s land-
scape is not exclusive to a person’s immediate local area in
terms of distance. Studies have shown that proximity to a
development is not always directly correlated with support
or opposition [21, 22]; rather, in this scenario, a person’s
landscape is more broadly defined to include places to which
that person has some type of attachment. People may have
attachments to their local home area as well as places such as
holiday spots, national parks, or other landscapes of special
interest. In addition, studies suggest that a person’s landscape
or “backyard” may not even stop at the coastline, that people
can sometimes consider offshore locations as part of their
landscape [23].
It should be noted that this project’s definition of NIMBY
is very different from the classic and highly contested
description of NIMBY, defined as “not in my backyard.”
This classic definition envisions the NIMBY objection as
opposition to a project which is not based on opposition to
the technology itself but rather opposition to a particular
project based on self-interest. Some describe true NIMBYs
as expressing positive attitudes towards a technology while
also expressing free rider preferences [15]. Many studies have
suggested that this classic NIMBY definition is an inaccurate
and erroneous term because it fails to reflect people’s true
motivations and masks a wide range of different motivations
[16, 24–26]. Further, other studies have shown little or no
evidence for the classic self-interest definition of NIMBYism
[15, 27–29]. It appears that NIMBY has become a pejorative
term often used to dismiss people’s valid concerns. Although
the term NIMBY is contested in academic literature, NIMBY
is still used as the title for this scenario in large part because it
has become a recognisable term in popular usage. However,
to avoid the pitfalls of the term NIMBY, it has been carefully
defined above as a form of place-protective action based on
negative visual landscape impacts.
3.2. NIMBY Scenario Quantification of Impacts. In the
NIMBY scenario, the deployment of onshore wind power is
limited based on the visual impact of the turbines, which has
been identified as a key reason behind people’s objections to
particular wind farms [15, 16, 21, 30]. The NIMBY scenario
assumes such a strong opposition to wind developments
based on visual impact that no new onshore wind appli-
cations receive planning approval. However, a number of
the projects which are already under construction or have
received planning consent are allowed to be built (figures for
this based on BWEA, [31]).This constraint translates to a total
of 8.9GW of onshore wind power capacity allowed in the
MARKAL model.
Offshore wind developments in the NIMBY scenario are
also subject to public objections based on visual impact.
Many studies have found that visual impact is a key factor
influencing people’s opinion of wind farms. Hagget [32]
found that simply siting wind turbines offshore does not
automatically solve problems of visual impact. Therefore, in
NIMBY, developments are only allowed beyond a 12 nautical
mile buffer where the turbines would be less visible and
there could be less public objections [23, 33–35]. Using
data from the Department of Energy and Climate Change
(DECC)’s Strategic Environmental Assessment Report [34],
the available offshore wind power beyond a 12 nautical mile
buffer zone is taken to be 80GW. This was used as the total
constraint on offshore wind power for the NIMBY scenario
in MARKAL.
The Severn tidal barrage is not allowed in the NIMBY
scenario because in this storyline, it is perceived as a negative
direct impact on the community.There are concerns over the
landscape impact of the barrage such as the potential shifts
in landscape type (such as mudflats and marshes), changes
to local sense of place-identity and place-attachment, and
changes to historic ports.
Nuclear power plants are not allowed to be sited in new
locations in the NIMBY scenario. However, in areas around
existing nuclear power plants, the nuclear plant is assumed
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to already be a feature of the landscape and community, and
therefore, in this scenario, the local community would be
likely to be willing to accept further nuclear power. Studies
have shown that people living near nuclear facilities express
higher support for increasing nuclear power in the future
[36], albeit perhaps transitory acceptance, with an ebb and
flow of concerns [37]. This local acceptance combined with a
general “reluctant acceptance” of nuclear power to help com-
bat climate change [38] means that in the NIMBY scenario,
existing nuclear power plants are allowed to be rebuilt at the
end of their lifetime and in some cases expanded (at sites
that already host multiple reactors). Using an assumption
that new 1600MW EPR reactors would be built on existing
commercial nuclear power sites, this scenario allows for up
to 30.4GW of nuclear power.
In the NIMBY scenario, coal carbon capture and storage
(CCS) is constrained by public objections to the direct
landscape impact of new power plants, capture plants, and
corresponding infrastructure such as pipelines and storage
facilities. As such, coal CCS is only allowed at a few existing
coastal power plant sites or other major existing industrial
sites. CCS technology appears to have low levels of public
understanding [39] and is unfamiliar to most people. Only
a few studies have examined attitudes to CCS and they have
found some negative attitudes towards storage and pipelines
for CCS [40, 41]. Another study suggests that there may be
differing opinions depending on the type of storage being
proposed (i.e., geological or oceanic) as well as the context
in which the technology is considered [42]. This is taken to
suggest that in aNIMBY scenario, CCSwould be constrained.
Yet, there would likely be a few coastal sites not subject to
NIMBY objections. So, for the NIMBY scenario, roughly
seven sites were considered to be consentable. With this
estimation, up to 10.5 GW of coal CCS installed capacity
would be allowed.
Bioenergy would be limited in the NIMBY scenario due
to people’s concerns over large areas of land being switched
to growing crops to be used for bioenergy. Bioenergy here
means biomass for heat and power production as well as in
the form of biofuels for transport. Switching large amounts of
land over for the purpose of growing biomass for bioenergy
would noticeably alter the landscape character and thus
would be subject to NIMBY concerns. Heiskanen et al. [43]
suggest that divergent interests in land use are one of the
major conflicts that can be found in case studies of public
acceptance of bioenergy. Therefore, an analysis was done
using a spatial mapping approach (with Joint Character
Areas) to determine what percentage of the UK productivity
might be available/allowable for bioenergy production under
a NIMBY scenario. This analysis suggested that under strong
NIMBY concerns, only 37% of the UK productivity would be
allowed to be cultivated by traditional crops for energy use.
In addition, second generation, dedicated energy crops
such as Miscanthus and willow (which are unfamiliar and
look quite different in the landscape from traditional crops)
were deemed to be unacceptable under NIMBY conditions
and thus none were allowed in the NIMBY scenario. So,
only first generation, traditional crops are allowed for energy
production.
3.3. ECO Scenario Definition. The ECO scenario represents
public objections to certain technologies and resources based
on the public’s perception of negative impacts on the natural
environment and ecosystem services. In the ECO scenario,
low carbon technologies are not simply justified on the
grounds of the reduction in carbon emissions; other environ-
mental impacts are considered to be important as well. Some
studies of energy projects, such as Firestone and Kempton
[44] who looked at the Cape Wind offshore wind project in
USA, have suggested that the public’s objections are largely
based on a perception of negative environmental impact.
This reflects a “green on green” clash of environmental values
between the protection of the environment through increased
use of low carbon energy technologies and the other environ-
mental damage that could be caused by deployment of those
low carbon technologies [21]. This contradiction between
different environmental values makes the deployment of
certain technologies problematic [15].
The specific impacts included in this scenariomay deviate
from an expert’s opinion in some cases but this is appropriate
here because this scenario aims to represent resistance to key
ecological impacts as perceived by the general public. These
public perceptions are informed by media coverage, high
profile scientists and NGOs, friends, and family as well as the
general level of knowledge about the impact. The public can
be seen to have differing levels of trust in key actors of an
energy development based on the perceived competence and
motivation of those actors [40]. These varying levels of trust,
understanding, and media coverage would all be expected to
shape the public opinion of the environmental impact of the
project.
3.4. ECO Scenario Quantification of Impacts. In the ECO
scenario, the public objects to some proposed onshore wind
farms due to concerns about the impact of the project on bird
and batmortality and damage to the land around the turbines
(for instance peat bogs and construction damage). Studies
have shown that concerns about birds can have a direct
impact on the decision to object to a certain wind project
even if it is not expressed in that person’s general attitude
towardswind power [15]. Yet, not all wind farms are perceived
as an ecological threat. Thus, in the ECO scenario there is
not a total constraint on the development of onshore wind
power; rather, a percentage of developments are assumed
to become highly contested on environmental grounds and
consequently do not receive the necessary planning approval.
In the ECO scenario, this constraint was translated into a
total capacity limit of up to 15GW of onshore wind that
would be allowed in UK (based on 25% of the total 20GW
resource available in the MARKAL model being rejected by
ECO concerns).
Offshorewind power in the ECO scenario is also assumed
to be moderately constrained by public concerns about the
potential ecological impact. Yet, these concerns are likely to
be lower for offshore wind farms that are located far offshore
as early evidence suggests reduced ecological impacts far
offshore [34, 35]. Thus, in the ECO scenario, offshore wind
development is only allowed beyond a coastal buffer of 12
nautical miles which would limit the potential ecological
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impacts on, for instance, bird life [34, 35]. DECC [34]
has suggested that there is 80GW of offshore wind power
available beyond 12 nautical miles which was therefore used
as the constraint on the installed capacity of offshore wind in
MARKAL.
The public perception of environmental impacts of wave
and tidal power is not very well understood. The general
public does not know very much about marine energy
devices. In addition, the devices are still being demonstrated
and thus there has been little conclusive research on their
environmental impact because demonstration projects are
not always obligated to carry out an environmental impact
assessment [45]. However, there is starting to be more
attention paid to the potential ecological impacts of wave
and tidal devices. For the purposes of the ECO scenario, it is
assumed that as more research is conducted, some negative
ecological impacts will be identified—for instance damage
to marine ecology due to leaking fluids or other operational
features [46]. Accordingly, in the ECO scenario, the general
public objects to certain wave and tidal devices as well as
objecting to developments in particular sensitive areas. For
this exercise, this is estimated as 25% of the wave and tidal
resource being unavailable for development due to ecological
concerns.
The Severn tidal barragewould not be allowed in the ECO
scenario because of public concern that the barrage would
damage the environment. A coalition of well-known organi-
sations such as the National Trust, RSPB and WWF opposes
the barrage as an environmental mistake; the public in this
scenario are assumed to follow these well-respected and
high profile organisations and oppose the barrage. Reports
from organisations such as the Sustainable Development
Commission [47] which found that there could be a serious
impact on the environment if the Severn barrage (Cardiff-
Weston Scheme) went ahead would also influence public
opposition to the barrage. Thus, the Severn barrage is not
allowed in ECO.
In the ECO scenario there are strong public concerns
about the sustainability merits of imported biomass and
biofuels.This has become a popular topic in themedia and the
general public has heard reports of rainforests being cleared,
the high carbon intensity of some crops and scientific reports
which call into question the sustainability of biofuels. This
coverage influences public perceptions of bioenergy. In this
scenario, the public views sustainability issues as manageable
for domestic crops but they do not feel confident in the
sustainability of imported crops. In order to manage the
sustainability of crops domestically, only certain areas of
UK would be available for bioenergy production. A spatial
mapping analysis using Joint Character Areas suggested that
only 11% of the UK productivity could be utilised [48].
Imported biomass and biofuels are completely prohibited
in the ECO scenario because of the public concerns. The
MARKAL model includes a high level of detail including
the distinction between domestic and imported biomass
and thus this constraint does limit the resource available in
the model. In the ECO scenario, the public also perceive
transport biofuels to have the potential to do more damage
to the environment than good and thus no transport biofuels
(domestic or imported) are allowed in UK.
The final constraint imposed in the ECO scenario is in
regard to fossil fuel availability. In ECO, global fossil fuel
prices are taken to be much higher than they are in the
low-carbon (LC) core scenario because under ECO concerns
certain environmentally sensitive areas would not be allowed
to be exploited and particularly environmentally damaging
methods of extractionwould also not be allowed, for example,
fracking for shale gas. Therefore, in the ECO scenario, the
global price of fossil fuels (coal, gas, and oil) is increased
substantially. Domestically, open cast coal mining in UK is
deemed too damaging and is not allowed in this scenario.
3.5. DREAD Scenario Definition. The DREAD scenario is
based on the concept of a “dread” response in which people
believe that there are some uncertain, involuntary, and poten-
tially catastrophic risks associated with a given technology
[49–51]. Thus, in the DREAD scenario the public perceive
certain technologies to pose a serious risk to human health
which causes them to categorically reject those technologies.
The determination of the potential risk to human health
in this scenario is based on people’s perception of the risks
rather than statistics of death or other quantitative measures
of risk. The perception of risk is based on factors such as
voluntariness, dread, knowledge, controllability, and benefits
[51]. For instance, despite the fact that more people die in car
accidents than in nuclear accidents, there is a greater fear of
nuclear accidents. This is largely because the perception of
risk of a nuclear accident is very different than a car accident;
people feel more control over the risks of driving a car, the
risk of a car accident is less potentially catastrophic, and
people perceive a more obvious benefit from driving a car
which outweighs the risks. With nuclear power, however, the
benefits may be less obvious and thus the public are less
willing to accept a high level of perceived risk for low levels
of perceived benefits.
Thus, in this scenario, deployments of technologies which
might invoke a DREAD response from the general public
are completely disallowed because strong public opposition
to those technologies would prohibit approval of any new
projects.This scenario is notmaking a judgement onwhether
the public’s fears are justified or not; it is simply attempting to
represent a highly risk-averse scenario.
3.6. DREAD Scenario Quantification of Impacts. In the
DREAD scenario, people completely reject new nuclear
power developments due to fear of potential catastrophic
consequences. Historic nuclear accidents such as Windscale,
Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima are, in this
scenario, assumed to still have a profound effect on society
and on people’s perception of the nuclear risk. Despite claims
that new nuclear power plants will be safer, in the DREAD
scenario, people still exhibit widespread concern over the
potential for nuclear accidents and storage safety. According
to the psychometric framework, nuclear reactor accidents,
radioactive waste, and other associated radioactive risks are
classified as highly dreaded [51].Hinman et al. [52] also report
high levels of public concern anddread about the potential for
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catastrophic accidents and storage of waste products. More
recently, Corner et al. [7] in a survey showed that only a
minority of people expressed unconditional acceptance of
nuclear power and the population remained divided over
its acceptability. The Fukushima accident sharply increased
public concern about safety (Poumadere´ et al. [53]) and
caused a number of nations to put nuclear development on
hold.Therefore, inDREAD, the public oppose all newnuclear
developments so no new nuclear power is built. Existing
nuclear power plants continue to operate until the end of their
lifetime but do not get lifetime extensions.
The public acceptance of coal CCS technologies is very
uncertain but may prove to be a serious barrier to deploy-
ment. Some studies suggest that people may object to CCS
technology based on the fear of the consequences of the
technology on human health, which is a dread response [54].
Singleton et al. [50] use the psychometric theory of pubic risk
perception to evaluate the public perception of risk from the
geologic storage of carbondioxide forCCS.Their results show
that, although CCSwith geologic storage is a new technology,
it is seen as a fairly high risk and dreaded; Singletons et al.’s
rankings place geologic storage of carbon as higher dread
than traditional fossil fuels, but lower than nuclear accidents
[50]. Thus, in the DREAD scenario, the public is assumed to
have a strong dread reaction to CCS which means that no
CCS power plants are allowed in UK.
In the DREAD scenario, the public is assumed to have a
dread response to hydrogen and fuel cell technology which
completely prohibits any deployments. There is a knowledge
gap with regard to the public’s understanding and percep-
tion of hydrogen and fuel cell technologies [55]. However,
there are some persistent public ideas about the dangers
of hydrogen; for instance, the vision of the Hindenburg
disaster persists despite the evidence that hydrogen was not
the critical factor in that disaster. This is an example of
how powerfully media exposure can affect public attitudes
and how important historical precedent can be to public
perceptions. Rhetoric about the dangers of hydrogen such as
is seen in Shinnar [56]which suggests that a hydrogen fuel cell
car could be made into a bomb by terrorists speaks explicitly
to the dread factor. This type of publicity and rhetoric about
hydrogen would increase the public’s dread response to the
technology and likely negatively influence public acceptance.
Thus, in the highly risk-averse DREAD scenario, the risks
of hydrogen fuel cell technologies are perceived as highly
unknown and potentially catastrophic (i.e., highly dreaded).
Therefore, no hydrogen and fuel cell deployments are allowed
in the DREAD scenario.
4. Modelling Results
4.1. Different Strategies Employed. When modelled with the
additional socio-environmental constraints on technologies
and resources, as described in the previous section, each of
the scenarios employs different strategies in order to continue
meeting the energy system requirements (including achiev-
ing 80% decarbonisation by 2050) at the lowest possible cost.
There are three key elements of these strategies that can be
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compared: the distribution of sectoral emissions, technology
selection and shifting, and demand reduction.
The first key element of the scenario’s differing strategies
can be seen in the distribution of sectoral CO
2
emissions.The
three scenarios each take unique approaches to decarbonising
the energy system in terms of the order and rate of decar-
bonisation of the sectors, which could be called the decar-
bonisation pathway.The scenarios employ different strategies
with regard to which sectors of the energy system carry
the highest burdens of decarbonisation (transport, industry,
etc.). All scenarios initially begin with decarbonisation in
the electricity sector but do so to varying degrees (and with
different mixtures of technologies and demand reduction as
will be discussed shortly); it is worth noting that all three
variants decarbonise electricity more aggressively than the
core scenario on which they are based due to the constraints
set by different sectors.
There are significant differences in the scenarios’ sectoral
breakdown of CO
2
emissions by 2050 with the ECO and
DREAD scenarios showing the greatest divergence from the
core LC scenario as seen in Figure 1. In ECO, for instance, the
additional constraints such as increased costs of fossil fuels
and the prohibition of transport biofuels make the transport
sector more difficult and costly to decarbonise. As a result,
the system chooses to make greater emissions reductions in
other sectors (such as the service and industry sectors) in
which there are lower cost decarbonisation options available;
the transport sector continues to use diesel and petrol which
creates high levels of transport emissions (Figure 1).
In DREAD, the electricity sector is almost completely
decarbonised through high levels of deployed wind power
to meet electricity demand. The heavy reliance on wind
power is due to strong constraints on the availability of other
technologies. As a result, the residential sector is able to
implement less of the high cost decarbonisationmeasures and
therefore accounts for a larger percentage of emissions than
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it does in any other scenario (see Figure 1). The residential
sector is mostly decarbonised by shifting to low carbon
electricity in LC. Since nuclear and CCS are not allowed in
DREAD, electricity is no longer a cost effective option to
decarbonise the residential sector and model selects other
options: decarbonising transport sector.
The second key element of the strategies employed
to achieve decarbonisation under the additional socio-
environmental constraints is the selection and deployment
of different technology mixes. The socio-environmental con-
straints explored in this work cause the scenarios to have
(i) lower technology diversity,
(ii) higher demand for electricity generation,
(iii) higher levels of installed capacity and/or
(iv) greater shifts and more exaggeration in the deploy-
ment of key energy technologies.
The differences in supply technology mixes can be seen
through the electricity generation and installed capacity of
the scenarios (Figures 2 and 3). The key technology shifts
highlighted in this paper are dramatic shifts to wind power
in DREAD, increased use of nuclear and wind in NIMBY
and ECO, and the shifting of limited biomass resources in
NIMBY.
Perhaps the most dramatic example of these technology
shifts can be seen in the DREAD scenario which has very
little diversity in the power sector. In the case of the DREAD
scenario the decreased diversity is due to the prohibition of
coal CCS or further nuclear power; as a result the model
chooses to deploy high levels of wind power to meet the
decarbonisation target. By 2050, the DREAD scenario has
an electricity sector that is predominately based on wind
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Figure 3: Electricity installed capacity in 2050. Scenarios are the
low carbon (LC) baseline and the three socio-environmental forms
(NIMBY, ECO, and DREAD).
power. In order to be able to utilise this high wind strategy,
the electricity system requires a very high installed capacity
with large amounts of installed wind and gas (gas is installed
to serve as a backup given wind power’s intermittency—
although the gas is not highly utilised). As a consequence
of this technology shift to high levels of wind power, the
scenario requires high levels of demand reduction. Demand
reduction is an economically favourable strategy in this
scenario because electricity becomes very expensive.
Another potential consequence of DREAD’s reliance
upon a single electricity generation source could be decreased
resilience. Some increased security may come from the
fact that the wind resource and operation are under UK
control. However the system’s dependence on wind power
introduces risks around periods of still air (little or no power
produced) and the threat of altered resource due to climate
change. Perhaps, for this type of power system, improved
and increased electricity storagemay be an attractive solution
to the issue of resilience. Yet, the DREAD scenario actually
employs less storage than the LC scenario. As an example,
the level of plug-in hybrid vehicles by 2035 in DREAD is
only about 60% of the total used in the LC scenario. Yet, this
decrease in plug-in hybrid storage inDREAD is unlikely to be
a direct result of changing storage requirements. Rather, it is
likely that electricity has become so expensive that the model
finds other, more cost-effective, options (biofuels ethanol and
biodiesel) to decarbonise the transport sector.
This appears to be an example of the limitations of the
MARKALmodel in that it seems unable to adequately capture
the opportunities of various storage technologies to support
intermittent power sources. In part, it is due to the lack of
temporal detail, the model combines everything into five-
year time steps with no annual, seasonal or diurnal structure
so is not capable of representing the dynamics of supply
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and demand realistically; it cannot model a moment when
the wind does not blow. It is also perhaps compounded by
the fact that the model does not allow for changes to the
way that the grid could operate in the future (such as smart
grids) and the fact that there is not enough data for advanced
storage technologies to be able to model their potential
effectively. This suggests the need for further research into
the possibilities of accelerated development of storage tech-
nologies to contribute to a low carbon and resilient energy
system.Thework done by UKERC on accelerated technology
development has not yet explored accelerated development
of storage technologies [5]. A similar issue is likely to arise
where the model selects nuclear and wind, as nuclear cannot
be ramped up and down to balance supply.
Another interesting technology shift can be seen upon
closer inspection of the types of wind power deployed
in the DREAD scenario. For the first time in any of the
UKERC scenarios, wind micro-generation is introduced to
the electricity system. DREAD deploys 5GW of wind micro-
generation. It seems likely that this only reaches 5GW due
to the very low capacity credits for any micro-wind over a
total of 5GW. The model has a total constraint on micro-
wind power of 15GW [57]. Micro-generation with wind is
unattractive for national provision as it has high costs and low
capacity. Its deployment that there are significant difficulties
in achieving decarbonisation in the electricity sector under
the constraints imposed by the DREAD scenario.
While NIMBY and ECO show less dramatic technology
shifts than DREAD, there are still important changes in the
electricity system. In NIMBY, where coal CCS is constrained
to only a few GW of installed capacity, nuclear power and
wind are able to relatively easily generate the majority of the
power needed by 2050 (despite being modestly constrained
themselves). However, this does require NIMBY to have a
larger system in terms of installed capacity than the LC
scenario. The ECO scenario also deploys high levels of wind
and nuclear but by 2050 requires higher levels of electricity
than the other scenarios due to additional electrification of
other sectors. The increased electrification could be due to
the increased cost of fossil fuels which make electrification
a more economical choice.
Other interesting shifts can be seen in the different ways
that limited bioenergy resources are utilised in NIMBY and
ECO (the two scenarios in which bioenergy is constrained).
In NIMBY, the limited bioenergy resources are shifted to the
aviation sector where they are used to make bio-kerosene.
While bio-kerosene is never deployed in the LC scenario
(or any other core scenario investigated by UKERC Energy
2050), both the NIMBY and DREAD scenarios replace all
aviation jet fuel with bio-kerosene by 2050. In the ECO
scenario, in which bioenergy is very heavily constrained
through the prohibition of imported crops aswell as transport
biofuels, the allowable bioenergy is still deployed. In ECO,
the limited biomass that is still available is utilised in the
service sector in the form of wood and later pellets. These
shifts and the continued use of bioenergy despite constraints
highlight how the flexibility of bioenergy resources can help
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Figure 4: Residential Electricity Demand Reduction.
the system achieve decarbonisation—even in the light of
possible constraints on sourcing and usage.
The third key element of the scenario’s different strate-
gies to achieve decarbonisation under possible socio-
environmental sensitivities is varying levels of demand reduc-
tion. As noted in Section 2, UK MARKAL MED allows
for flexible demand reduction in response to energy prices,
optimising the balance between the cost of supplying energy
and the lost welfare incurred by any reduction in energy
service demand. As with the various sources of energy
generation, levels of demand reduction can be tracked at 5-
year intervals throughout the period of the model. The level
of demand reduction reported at any given five-year time step
relates to the cost of supplying energy services at that point
in time. Years where the available energy supply technology
mix is more expensive will drive greater demand reduction
than in years where the cost of supplying energy is less.
Thus, the trajectory of demand reduction is not smooth but
responds dynamically to the cost of supplying energy within
the steadily increasing carbon constraint. As a consequence,
the outputs do not appear as simple smooth lines but can
change direction in consecutive time periods.
In all scenarios, including the LC scenario, there is a
general trend for increasing need to reduce demand over
time, reflecting the generally increasing cost of the supply
mix, which is in turn driven by the increasing carbon
constraint. Yet, for all three socio-environmental scenar-
ios, the additional constraints on the system arising from
the limits placed on key technologies cause some level of
increased demand reduction across different sectors of the
energy system (such as industry residential, and transport).
The varying level of demand reduction depends in part on
the relative costs of demand reduction and decarbonising
power generation. As an example, the demand reduction
in residential electricity and gas (Figures 4 and 5) shows
an increasing trend over time as well as increased demand
reductions in the socio-environmental scenarios.
In general, the NIMBY scenario’s demand reduction is
only greater than the LC scenario in certain sectors and
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Figure 5: Residential gas demand reduction.
time periods. Thus, NIMBY could be considered to employ
roughly similar (albeit slightly increased) demand reduction
strategies to the LC scenario. Yet, in ECO and DREAD,
the level of demand reduction utilised is generally greater
than that in the LC scenario in all sectors and across most
of the time periods. This suggests that ECO and DREAD
constraints may increase the stress on the system more than
the NIMBY constraints; alternatively, the costs of generating
low carbon power are higher than those associated with
reducing demand.
The greatest deviation from the standard LC scenario is
the use of residential electricity in DREAD (Figure 4). The
rate of change is the highest between 2010 and 2020 by which
timeDREAD’s demand reduction has already increased to the
level achieved in LC by 2050. This reflects the added cost,
especially in the early periods, of making the low carbon
transition whilst excluding technologies such as nuclear and
CCS. All four scenario variants then change at approximately
the same rate. For residential gas, the four scenario variants
change more consistently (Figure 5).
4.2. Costs of Socio-Environmental Constraints. All three
socio-environmental scenarios explored in this paper impose
higher financial and social costs than the LC scenario. The
increased costs can be seen in three different measures:
marginal cost of CO
2
, undiscounted energy system cost, and
consumer and producer surplus. Consumer and producer
surplus is used as a measure of societal welfare and is thus
an indicator of the scenarios’ social costs.
The marginal cost of CO
2
increases over time in all of
the scenarios, including the baseline LC scenario, due to the
increasing difficultly and cost of achieving the decarboni-
sation targets (80% by 2050). However, the marginal cost
in some of the socio-environmental scenarios increases at a
faster rate or at different times than the LC scenario. In the
near term (2015–2030) the DREAD scenario has the highest
marginal cost of CO
2
. However, by 2050 the marginal cost
of CO
2
in the ECO scenario is the highest and is rapidly
increasing as seen in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Marginal cost of CO
2
.
The undiscounted energy system cost can be used
as another measure of the financial costs of the socio-
environmental scenarios. It is roughly similar in the LC,
NIMBY and DREAD scenarios—although NIMBY and
DREADeach deviate upwards from the LC scenario at certain
times. In the ECO scenario, however, the undiscounted
energy system cost is consistently higher than any of the other
scenarios from 2015 onwards. This increased cost in ECO
grows from approximately £2.5 billion more expensive than
the next most expensive scenario in 2015 to £9 billionmore in
2050. This suggests that the ECO constraints force the model
to do much more of the expensive decarbonisation measures
in order to be able to achieve decarbonisation targets. Given
that MARKAL optimises the energy system for the lowest
energy system costs, ECO would appear to cause the highest
level of marginal costs associated with CO
2
on the system.
If the sum of consumer and producer surplus is used
as a partial measure of social welfare, it becomes evident
that all of the socio-environmental scenarios impose a higher
social cost than the LC scenario. Yet, it is the ECO scenario
that once again imposes the greatest costs; the ECO sce-
nario shows a significantly greater decline in welfare from
2015 onwards than the LC, NIMBY, or DREAD scenarios
(Figure 7). However, this measure of social welfare is perhaps
not the best way to envision social welfare in these types of
scenarios. The constraints in these scenarios are meant to
represent social sensitivities and preferences, so there should
be some social benefits gained by responding to these prefer-
ences. Consumer and producer surplus, a traditionalmeasure
of welfare (which theorises decreasing social welfare with
increasing demand reduction, etc.), may not be as applicable
in a possible future where people choose to reduce demand
and remake the energy system in response to concerns and
sensitivities.
These three measures illustrate that public responses to
low carbon technologies have the potential to substantially
impact not only the make-up of the energy system but also
the financial and social costs of decarbonisation.Theway that
public attitudes and responses constrain the deployment of
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Figure 7: Societal welfare expressed as consumer and producer
surplus.
certain technologies or resources could make decarbonisa-
tion more challenging and costly but it could also have the
potential to make decarbonisation more equitable and just.
Yet, these socio-environmental sensitivities are not always
included in discussions of decarbonisation; unfortunately,
when they are, the focus is often on overcoming public atti-
tudes rather than genuinely engaging with and considering
public sensitivities. If these public sensitivities and responses
continue to be neglected, theremay be an increased chance of
decarbonisation targets not being met, serious backlash from
the public, and/or increased costs of decarbonisation.
5. Discussion
5.1. Societal Impacts and Interactions. The energy systems
which are deployed in the three socio-environmental scenar-
ios are all working systems given the conditions imposed by
the MARKALmodel and they all reach 80% decarbonisation
by 2050. However, in the real world, these energy systems
could be difficult to deploy and/ormanage and, in some cases,
may seem implausible. The level of challenge in these scenar-
ios reflects the severity of the potential socio-environmental
constraints and the stresses that those constraints could
impose on the system. These stresses could make it difficult
to achieve decarbonisation targets while continuing to meet
society’s demand for energy services. Yet, ignoring these
potential socio-environmental constraints does not stop the
constraints from arising; it just means being less prepared
to deal with them. Thus, if there continues to be a gap
in the understanding and methods of working with public
sensitivities to low carbon energy technologies and resources,
it will just make the issue harder and more expensive to deal
with in the future [58].
The scenarios suggest that important changes will need
to be made to both the technologies deployed in the energy
system as well as to the way the society interacts with
issues of energy and climate change. One of the more
extreme scenarios, DREAD, is highly dependent on wind
power and has little diversity within the electricity sector.
Accordingly, DREAD is a costly scenario and would seem
to be implausible in reality. However, if society was to take
such a risk averse position creating a less resilient energy
system, other values and components would have to change.
For instance, in DREAD’s wind dominated system these
necessary changes might include advances in storage, grid
technologies, interconnection, thermal backup and demand
side response to manage the high level of wind power, public
willingness to reduce demand, and/or public acceptance that
the full 80% decarbonisationmay not be met.This message is
likely to be an unpopular one; it highlights the seriousness of
the decarbonisation challenge.
Two potential ways to manage an energy system under
these types of socio-environmental constraints include tech-
nological solutions and a re-evaluation of priorities and
choices (this is a more societal solution that means involving
the public in choices). These options are by no means
mutually exclusive. In terms of technological solutions, there
is potential for advances in certain technologies (such as stor-
age) and improvements in grid infrastructure and operation
(such as smart grids) to make the scenarios more feasible.
Technological fixes are, however, unlikely to be the only
answer.Thiswork also highlights the importance of genuinely
considering and engaging with socio-environmental sensi-
tivities; societies may need to consider their priorities and
options (on a personal and societal level) and make some
difficult choices.
It is important to note that genuinely addressing socio-
environmental sensitivities and public opinions does not
mean ignoring or overcoming them, rather it suggests that
they need to be understood and incorporated into decisions.
Unfortunately, asDevine-Wright [59, page 10] states, “genuine
understanding of the dynamics of public acceptance remains
elusive.” Working with Batel [60] they call for the concept of
“acceptance” to be debated and redefined in terms of public
attitudes towards low carbon technology and its infrastruc-
ture. Aitken [61] suggests the need to better understand the
social context of renewables as well as the public relationship
with planning processes. Likewise, Ellis et al. [62] point
out that this understanding should not just be focused on
objectors, as this completelymisses out on any understanding
of the way that support is constructed.
Decisions about the energy system currently seem to be
made whilst leaving the public a bit behind, viewing the
public as a barrier to be overcome or an enabler of certain
types of action rather than inherently the core group of deci-
sion makers. This research suggests that the public actually
have a more important and involved role to play because
ultimately all members of society will determine the future
of the energy system through the decisions they make and
the way that they interact with technologies, institutions, and
policies.Thus, this work calls for an increased understanding
of public sensitivities around low carbon technologies and
changes to the process of energy system change in order to
get the public engaged and incorporated early in the process
of decarbonisation.This could take the shape of newmethods
of public engagement, alternative models of community
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ownership and/or benefits, different methods of studying
public sensitivities, changes in planning procedure, and/or
changes to the way that the challenges of decarbonisation
and the necessary choices and trade-offs are shared with and
discussed with the public.
If this does not happen early in the process of managing
decarbonisation and there remains little understanding of
socio-environmental sensitivities and poor public engage-
ment, there may be subsequent choices which do not reflect
prevailing social sentiments. This is likely to make decarbon-
isation even more challenging as there would be less time to
prepare more acceptable, alternative solutions.
There is a need for further research on how best to engage
with the complex area of real public socio-environmental
sensitivities; scenarios such as this one are too simpli-
fied to accurately reflect the interactions of broad socio-
environmental sensitivities but nevertheless attempt to begin
exploring the issue using a highly utilised modelling tool.
6. Conclusions
These socio-environmental scenarios have illustrated how
potential socio-environmental sensitivities and public accep-
tance of technologies could impact the possible pathways to
decarbonisation and the energy system as a whole. Despite
the fact that the scenarios explored in this work cannot fully
represent the complexities of the real world and are not
designed to be forecasts, they do offer useful insight into the
potential types of impact on the energy system.The scenarios
indicate that socio-environmental sensitivities could play a
significant role in shaping how decarbonisation could be
achieved, and at what cost.
Accelerating the development of a suite of low carbon
energy technologies could be an important way to improve
the chances of achieving the decarbonisation targets given
a potentially socio-environmentally constrained energy sys-
tem. As it is difficult to predict how society will respond
to low carbon energy technologies and the changing energy
system, having a number of alternatives available could help
ensure that there are some acceptable options to achieve
decarbonisation.
These scenarios also suggest the need for further research
which could better represent the complexities of socio-
environmental sensitivities and public acceptance. In real-
ity, attitudes and acceptance are multi-faceted issues, vary
immensely amongst the members of the public, and are
not static over time; this makes it impossible to predict or
reflect public acceptance issues with any degree of accuracy.
Yet, by modelling a few simplified scenarios of possible
socio-environmental sensitivities, this work is able to begin
to explore the different types (and severity) of impacts
that could be seen in the energy system. With hope, the
results from the scenarios can be used to better inform the
process of decarbonisation by raising important issues about
how members of the public are engaged with low carbon
technologies and the process of wider energy system change
for decarbonisation; these issues must be considered in order
to improve the chance of achieving decarbonisation targets.
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